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it remanded the issue back to the district court for an explanation of the lower court's  
rationale. 
Nicole Oversier 
Class of 2006 
THE PROPRIETY OF AN ADMIN ISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CONSIDERING 
AN INDIVIDUAL'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF A D ISABILITY 
CLAIM 
A claim of mistake in a motion to modify disability benefits based on medical 
reports created after the initial decision is a factual, rather than legal issue. Thus it 
is proper for an Administrative Law J udge to consider the motion. 
Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Campbell 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
59 Fed. Appx. 568 
(Decided March II, 2003) 
In I987, appellee Terry Campbell injured his head, neck, and back while working 
for appellant Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation ("Norshipco"). After the 
incident, Campbell continued to work for Norshipco from May I987 to January I993 
receiving differing amounts of disability compensation. In response, Campbell filed a 
claim for temporary total disability under the Longshore and Harbor Worker's 
Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). After reviewing Campbell's claim, the Administrative 
Law Judge ("ALJ") concluded that: (I) Campbell was not fired in retaliation for filing a 
disability claim, (2) suitable alternate employment existed despite Campbell's limitations, 
and (3) Campbell was fired from the suitable alternate employment for willful 
misconduct. Accordingly, the ALJ rejected Campbell's claim for temporary total 
disability. 
Campbell filed a request for modification pursuant to Section 22 of the LHWCA, 
which allows a compensation decision to be modified based on a change of condition or a 
mistake of fact. Campbell alleged a change in condition and a mistake of fact with regard 
to his ability to perform the light duty employment offered by Norshipco. After a second 
hearing, the ALJ concluded that there had been no change in condition nor had there been 
a mistake of fact. Campbell appealed this decision to the Department of Labor's Benefits 
Review Board ("BRB"). The BRB affirmed the AU's decision that there had been no 
change in condition, but remanded for further consideration on the issue of whether there 
had been a mistake of fact regarding the alternate employment offered to Campbell. On 
remand, the ALJ concluded that the alternate work offered by Norshipco was outside 
Campbell's abilities and awarded him permanent partial disability benefits. After 
subsequent appeals by Norshipco to the BRB, the ALJ issued a final order awarding 
limited benefits to Campbell. After the BRB affirmed this decision, Norshipco appealed 
to the Fourth Circuit. 
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On appeal, Norshipco first argued that the ALJ erred in considering Campbell's 
modification motion since it was based on a legal, rather than factual, contention. 
Furthermore, Norshipco argued the BRB erred when it rejected the ALI's decision on the 
merits rather than concluding that the ALJ exceeded its authority in reconsidering a legal 
ISSUe. 
In addressing Norshipco's contentions, the court first ruled that Campbell's 
motion for modification was based on a factual contention. The court held that as 
Campbell's claim was based on a disagreement as to the interpretation of medical 
evidence, it was factual in nature. Furthermore, the court found that the BRB did not 
reweigh the merits and substitute its own judgment for the ALJ's, but rather, remanded 
the case for further consideration on an issue. Indeed, the court found that all the BRB 
required was that the ALJ consider all the available evidence. 
Norshipco next argued that the BRB erred in its findings regarding the available 
alternate employment. The court found that no such errors existed as the BRB in fact 
made no findings with regard to alternated employment. Again, the court alluded to the 
fact that the BRB simply remanded the case for reconsideration on whether, when fully 
considering all the available medical evidence, Campbell could perform the alternate 
employment offered by Norshipco. 
Finally, Norshipco argued that Campbell's appeal to the BRB was untimely filed. 
In addressing this issue, the court looked to 22 C.F.R. § 802.217(a), which puts 
extensions of time for such appeals within BRB discretion. The court reasoned that, as 
Norshipco made no allegations that the BRB abused its discretion, Campbell's brief was 
properly received by the BRB. 
Ultimately, the court affirmed the decisions of the two lower bodies and granted 
Campbell limited benefits for his disability. 
Carl Benincasa 
Class of 2005 
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